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In our study, we give a sketch of the establishment and development of Hungarian economic 
criminal law, and its characteristic features after the change of regime. When examining this 
topic, we have to briefly treat the concept of economic criminal law and introduce the 
characteristic features of the Hungarian mode of regulating. Following this, we briefly look 
back at the period between the creation of the first Hungarian codified criminal code and the 
last decade of the past century. In the next chapter of the study, we analyse the criminal law 
aspects, controversies and lessons of moving to market economy, and finally, we touch upon a 
couple of current issues with view to the fact that our country has been a member of the 
European Union for two years, thus the norms of the union have also become a part of our 
legal system. 
 
1. The concept of economic criminal law  
 
Economic criminal law is the sum total of legal regulations within and outside criminal law 
that define which of the actions threatening the economic order (that is, the orderly operation 
of the economy) are considered criminal acts, how the perpetrators of these are to be held 
responsible, what sanctions can be applied against them and how. 
We can make the following conclusions on the basis of the above definition: 
• economic criminal law is a sub-area of criminal law; therefore, in a wider sense, it 
includes the procedural law regulations and the regulations of the execution of 
sentences which do not show marked differences from the general rules; therefore, we 
do not cover these; 
• in Hungary, economic criminal law is constituted by criminal law (primary) norms and 
legal norms outside criminal law (secondary). The Hungarian criminal law is a unified, 
codified criminal law; we do not acknowledge the law-development role of judge-made 
law or only in a very narrow circle1. The secondary (non-criminal law) norms play a 
role mostly when the primary norms do not contain all the positive and negative 
conditions of culpability. In this case, the criminal law norm sets out only that frame 
which the secondary norm fills with concrete contents. This is necessary because the 
frequent modification of the criminal code is undesirable; criminal law has to show a 
relative stability. Secondary norms, on the contrary, can be modified dynamically.2  
 
1 In our view, the role of judge-made law is not more than the explanation of the law, or the clarification of 
certain concepts, but analogy is forbidden: that is, the principle of “nullum crimen sine lege” is enforced. 
2 One example: In Hungary, the failure of the reporting obligation related to money laundering is a criminal act. 
But how wide a circle this obligation is enforced in and exactly what its contents are is defined by a secondary 
norm, this norm is Law XV of the year 2003, on the prevention and obstruction of money laundering. If, 
therefore, we would like to include several service providers in the circle of those with a reporting obligation, we 
do not necessarily have to reach for the criminal code, it is enough to modify or replace the secondary norm. We 
could continue the list with a number of secondary norms such as, for instance, the Law on Accountancy, the 
Bankruptcy Law or the Competition Law. 
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2. From Code Csemegi to the change of regime  
 
We are only going to present a rough outline of the history of Hungarian economic criminal 
law, only from 1878, the birth of the first written criminal code. This law – which grateful 
posterity named after its creator, Csemegi Károly – already contained some economic 
criminal acts (for instance, counterfeiting and criminal bankruptcy). Sketchily, we can divide 
the period between 1878 and the present day into three main sections, according to the 
dominant economic system philosophy: “early” or liberal capitalism – socialism – “modern” 
capitalism. Naturally, within the three main sections, we can distinguish between further 
periods; and the exact setting out of the borderlines can also be debated (as the criminal law 
legal regulations react to economic and social changes only after a more-or-less long period of 
time). 
 
Due to economic policy closely connected with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, preferring 
agriculture to industry, the liberal-capitalist development in Hungary could blossom only with 
some delay, and by the time the legal background could have fully developed, the First World 
War broke out. In the interest of the mitigation of the severe economic consequences, having 
tight control over production for the needs of the war and regulation, at this time, the 
continuity of provision was attempted to be kept up by means of extraordinary, mostly 
restrictive regulations. 
In the decades following the war, the more “consolidated” forms of the intervention of the 
state by means of criminal law tools appeared one after the other: for instance, a law was 
created about price-hiking abuse, unfair competition, or loan fraud. 
Naturally, during the course of the Second World War, such restricting measures that kept the 
interests of the military economy in mind were again needed.  
In 1949, by accepting the Stalinist constitution, Hungary stepped on the “road of building 
socialism”. By relying on the principles of Marxist-Leninist economics, the communist party, 
in exclusive possession of political power (the Hungarian Workers’ Party), introduced a 
strictly controlled economy system. In addition to the strong centralisation of the economy, 
further characteristic features of this system involved control affecting the whole of the 
economy, as well as the consistent supervision of the economic processes, going into details.3 
Social ownership became dominant in the economy (which meant the totality of state and 
cooperative ownership), and the proportion of private ownership fell to an insignificant 
proportion. 
During the period of the introduction of planned economy, the principle of imperative 
planning was enforced, and the behaviour of the players of the economy was exactly 
prescribed. Central directions were applied in all the sectors of the economy. All this was 
accompanied by very strict economic law regulation. In place of the prescriptions of Code 
Csemegi affecting economic criminal law, regulations keeping in mind the unlimited, formal 
protection of the interests of the national economy plans were introduced. However, the 
possessors of political-economic power soon realised that the approach rigidly insisting on the 
prescriptions of the plans resulted not in the development of the economy but its falling back 
and regression. This new approach looked for the increase of social and personal well-being 
not in the rigid performance of the plan but a flexible control of the economy, taking the 
operation of economic laws into account. Thus, the second Hungarian Criminal Code created 
in 1961 (Law V of the year 1961) – according to the changed attitude – kept the content- 
protection of the plan in mind; that is, it only sanctioned those violations of obligation that are 
 
3 Prof. Dr. Erdősy Emil: Gazdasági rendszerünk büntetőjogi védelme a tervgazdálkodás időszakában (In: Tóth 
Mihály-Gál István László (Editors): Gazdasági büntetőjogi tanulmányok Pécs, 2005. pp. 25-26) 
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formally against the law and that result in material consequences – that is, significant 
economic disadvantage – in the economic life. 
As a result of the 1968 economic reform, independent economic accounting was introduced. 
This meant that within the framework of planned state control, companies have operative 
independence: they can sell their products as goods in the market, from their income they can 
cover their costs, and, in addition, they can achieve corporate net income. (They organise their 
activities as a legally independent economic unit.) Naturally, the economic reforms affected 
economic criminal law as well. Law-decree 28 of the year 19714 secured the protection of the 
plan already within the framework of the restricted market conditions. 
Our third, still valid Criminal Code was passed by the Parliament in 1978. Among the 
gradually increasing market conditions, Law IV of the year 1978 secured the criminal law 
protection of the planned economy until the change of regime taking place in 1989. 
 
While the political collapse of the socialist system – to a great extent following the changes 
taking place in the Soviet Union – took place quickly and mostly unexpectedly, the severe 
economic crisis had been noticeable for a longer period of time. Standard of living had been 
continuously dropping in the second part of the 1980s, inflation accelerated, the indebtedness 
of the country got almost completely out of hand. In order to avoid complete anarchy, 
something had to be done to the economy by which a certain scope was offered by the fact 
that the economic policy of our country – as compared to the other countries of the eastern 
block – was somewhat more independent, liberal and open.5 Thus the commencement of the 
establishment of the market economy started before the first free elections (1990), and the 
company law aimed at the reorganisation of the state companies was accepted already in 
1988. Following the political change of regime, the reorganisation of economic law 
accelerated. New laws were created one after the other (e.g. about the order of taxation and 
the individual taxes, the bankruptcy and liquidation procedures, accountancy, unfair market 
behaviour and the bank on competition restriction, financial institutions, or the stock 
exchange). According to this, the chapter of the Criminal Code regulating the economic 
criminal acts was changing continuously. 
The last criminal acts supported by the earlier approach are also gradually being eliminated 
from this chapter (e.g. profiteering or offences against foreign currency regulations protecting 
the state monopoly of the trade of goods, foreign currencies and precious metals); however, 
according to the foreign recommendations, for instance, money laundering, computer fraud or 
insider trading are to be prosecuted.  
However, the relatively flexible legal regulation could not prevent the appearance and spread 
of mostly new types of criminal acts that were fed primarily by the lessening of the role the 
state played, the mystification of the unlimited freedom of enterprise, the increase of revenue-
distribution tensions6, or the strengthening of insecurities in the area of criminal prosecution 
that came with the transition.   
 
 
 
4 In the socialist era, this legal source was at the same level as laws. It was issued not by the Parliament but by 
the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic. It was also possible to modify laws with law-
decrees. 
5 It is characteristic that the “business work communities” and the “subsidiary production branches” in the 
industry and the territory of services operated practically on the basis of completely individual interests, and in 
addition to the common land of the agricultural cooperatives, the members also had separate pieces of land, so-
called household farms, serving individual production and marketing. 
6 The Lorenz-curve, developed for the measurement of the concentration of income, started to curve to the right 
and down, which referred to a very unfavourable tendency. (In illustration of this process, here is a quotation 
from the Bible: “Those who have a lot receive even more, and those who have little have it taken away.”)  
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3. The characteristic economic criminal acts of the move to market economy  
 
We can characterise the economic crime of the last decade and half in Hungary with three 
related types of crime: the so-called “oil-cases”, privatisation encroachment, and the 
fraudulent evasion of different dotations, allowances, contributions (reclamations). 
 
a) If we asked people at random in Hungary today what economic crimes were the most 
characteristic in the years of the change of the regime, the answer would most probably be 
criminal acts in connection with oil and oil products. Smuggling related to this, excise 
encroachment, and tax fraud, have almost become signs of the 1990s. 
In the beginning, the opportunity for encroachment was provided by the fact that there was a 
significant difference between the price of gasoline, used as motor fuel, and home heating oil 
– with a completely identical composition and quality – for socio-political reasons. This 
offered the chance for pocketing the profit from the price difference on a silver tray. 
Therefore, heating oil purchased at a lower price was used and sold as fuel. With the 
introduction of the new tax system, the difference grew even more as, in addition to higher 
VAT, fuel was also burdened by consumption tax, environmental product fee and road fund 
contribution. Therefore, the formal difference between the oil destined for two different 
purposes had to be made more marked and visible. Therefore, the colouring of heating oil was 
directed. 
Essentially, it was the removal of the colouring agent by use of acids, the later infamous “oil 
bleaching”, which became an almost independent “criminal industry” in Hungary. 
Thus the primitive method of distinguishing by means of dying did not work either, so in 
1993, gasoline was made a (strictly controlled) excise product, while heating oil was sold by 
means of tickets. 
There came – expectedly – the buying up of the tickets and the spread of ticket counterfeiting, 
the only answer to which could be the total abolition of the price difference. Thus this was the 
end of social sensitivity in 1995, but the only hope was that finally this also put an end to the 
oil mafia.  
Unfortunately, this was unfounded, as, at the same time the decision was made, the tax-free 
status of the production and marketing of certain “light” oil products was also expanded. 
Needless to say, this is what happened: every day, dozens of trains were customs cleared that 
– according to the importers – carried sewing machine oil, anti-rust and anti-congealing agent. 
The quantity would have been enough for the whole world’s sewing machine fleet for several 
years. The issue stretched beyond the customs authorities and the police, and was already 
harping on the possibility of political interpenetration. 
Today, oil fraud is practically not profitable any more, the allowances ceased to exist, or, as a 
result of the establishment of the sufficient control mechanism, they operate more or less 
properly. 
By the time this took place, just the uncovered oil cases caused damage of about 90 billion 
HUF for the budget7. 
 
b) The other marked projection of encroachment could be experienced in connection with the 
privatisation of state property. 
 
7 The damage caused through economic crimes is 60-70 billion HUF per year recently (1 billion HUF = 
approximately 400,000 Euros), and only some 15% of this amount is covered in the criminal procedures. If we 
also take into consideration the criminal acts against property, damage of altogether 180-200 billion HUF caused 
through crime is lost without trace, and unfortunately there is no data about the subsequent recovery of at least a 
part of this amount. 
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The privatisation of companies and state cooperatives was often accompanied by the 
suspicion of corruption; however, only a fraction of such cases got to the court. It is a fact that 
different interest groups and associations also related to politics often got hold of valuable 
production and servicing plants which were not necessarily declining, with rather low starting 
capital and at a strikingly low price. In other cases, privatisation-related loans offered a 
possibility for establishing corrupt relationships. 
 
The managing director of one of the banks, for instance, would provide credit for starting entrepreneurs 
on condition that the new owners gave 10-15% of the shares of the companies privatised from the loan to 
companies in the circle of interest of the managing director for free. After the case came to light, the 
banker said in his defense that he only used a bank practise frequently applied in developed countries: the 
institution of “the fiduciary hand”. According to this, the condition of providing a loan is that the debtor 
concludes a contract with the business counselling companies designated by the bank, and those, by 
following the profitability of the business of the company, ensure the return of the loan However, 
according to the court, the general manager practically worked to fill his “own pocket”, and the debtors 
could not expect any counselling in return for the shares they handed over. 
 
c) The third group of cases was constituted by the fraudulent use of the different allowances, 
dotations, exemptions and other financial possibilities provided by the state. 
The method of commission is very simple here: the perpetrators fraudulently declare and – if 
need be – support with forged certificates that they are entitled to the given allowance. 
 
When created, the law on investment secured customs and tax-free status to that person living abroad who 
– for the joint venture established by him – imported production tools to Hungary as contribution in kind. 
The motivation for the direction was clear: this is how the introduction of developed technology was 
endeavoured to be encouraged. A re-settled defendant of Hungarian origins, by establishing dozens of 
joint ventures that were not performing any actual business activities imported and then sold hundreds of 
cars as “contribution in kind”. His reasoning was based on the fact that the objects of the service also 
constituted production tools – and he did not conclude deeds of sale but leasing contracts (that is, 
performed services) – and it is nobody’s business that – within the scope of contractual freedom – the 
lessee paid 99% of the full leasing fee in one amount and paid the 1% in 12 monthly instalments. 
The charge raised because of smuggling was based on the fact that the transactions do not constitute 
service but deeds of sale (maybe attempted to be veiled in a primitive fashion), and production tools 
cannot be the objects of commercial trade; therefore, the defendant hid the actual purpose of the imported 
objects from the customs authority. 
 
Naturally, fraud happened not only in connection with allowances for foreign investors; often, 
some tried to obtain support with socio-political purposes in a fraudulent way.  
 
It happened that for years a group came into very high amounts of state support by stating that they 
provided work for close to one hundred employees with reduced work ability. In fact, they only employed 
two such persons but the doctor plotting with them issued false doctor’s certificates about the other 
workers. 
 
In another case, people tried to make use of the fact that those families with several children who tried to 
solve their problem of establishing a home could expect significant amounts of non-reimbursable socio-
political support for the purchase of the un-built-in attics of family homes. 
The method of encroachment was that resourceful mediators brought together the claimants with several 
children with the owners of family houses with empty attics, from whom they purchased the attic on 
paper, had plans drawn up about making it liveable, with respect to which they requested support; and 
when they received that, with a new deed of sale, they simply transferred the attic – now as sellers – to the 
owners. Naturally, nobody moved anywhere, only paperwork took place. The amount of the support was 
then split up by the owner, the seller-buyer, and the owner of the idea, the mediator.  
 
In this circle, the most serious and still existing problem is posed by the fraudulent 
reclamation of value-added tax. 
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The perpetrators of one of the most frequent economic criminal acts make use of the fact that 
the tax office reimburses entrepreneurs for the vale-added tax of the goods they purchase (this 
is still very high in Hungary, 25%). There were masses of criminal procedures against people 
who did not perform any business activity but purchased fake invoices from criminal groups 
specialising in this, the so-called “invoice factories”, reclaimed the tax from the amount of the 
invoice, and paid commission from this to those forging the invoices. Unfortunately, this 
series of encroachment is practically still going on as of today, the only difference being that 
nowadays the fictitious reclamation is usually attempted to be covered up partly by actual 
economic activities. 
The reaction of the state was also characteristic in these cases: after the criminal acts were 
discovered – but only after that – the system of the payment or control of the support was 
changed. However, resourceful perpetrators who are always a step ahead of criminal 
prosecution did not find it difficult to devise new possibilities. 
 
4. Some lessons  
 
It might not be without interest to take into account what more significant lessons we can state 
from the experience served by the above, typical criminal acts. 
Our starting point is the previously proven fact that a major proportion of economic criminal 
acts (or criminal acts of an economic nature) is related to some allowance, support or 
exemption, as we have experienced not only in the latter group of cases but in connection with 
the “oil cases” as well.  
Unfortunately, it is the characteristic feature of transitional market economies that these 
allowances are often used not according to their lawful purpose and normal market functions.  
The institution of leasing, for instance, is operated primarily not as the method of modern 
fixed assets development, but as veiled purchase if this is slightly better either for the seller or 
the buyer or both as, let’s say, the purchase of the object of lease does not constitute 
investment; however, the purchase price called lease fee can always be accounted in tax. 
Similarly, the foreigner’s contribution in kind does not serve the development of the 
enterprise or the introduction of modern technology, supported heating oil does not serve 
heating, and the cars imported under the name of the handicapped does not serve the transport 
of the handicapped (it is not he who will park with the parking permit issued to him for free). 
We have also seen that the good advice of the “counselling companies” operating within the 
framework of the “fiduciary hand” – unlike the developed western practice referred to – is 
usually not more than where and in what amount their kickback, called honorarium, is to be 
transferred. 
Good examples of the almost regular dysfunctional operation are offered by the new forms of 
business management. Nowadays, we can still consider it typical that many establish business 
enterprises not necessarily because they want to establish the ideal structural framework of 
optimal business that is useful at an individual, corporate and social level, but so that they 
have a way to completely smuggle the income from the activity, and restrict the liability for 
the debts to the vanished company assets. Thus the responsibility of the limited liability 
company often becomes unlimited individual absence of liability. 
 
Therefore we have to prepare for these encroachments originating still mostly from our 
transitional conditions and unfortunately must make preparations against them for the long 
run.  
To avoid possible misunderstanding, we are not encouraging that the dotations be eliminated 
(from an economic point of view this would be an impossible requirement), but that they are 
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to be applied in a more conscious, considered, and controlled manner. We think that a more 
wary, careful but mostly more foreseeing regulation is needed. 
We could also say: more and more pessimistic empathy. 
Every decision that can put anybody – even indirectly – in a beneficiary position is to be made 
in such a way that we consider well in advance its consequences and forms “beyond the 
intent”, or, even better, its dysfunctional consequences and forms avoiding good intentions, 
and try to eliminate these in advance. All this requires primarily conscientious and 
circumspect lawmaking.  
In addition to professional codification, we also think that it is a significant requirement that 
through the continuous training of policemen, prosecutors and judges, and the extension of 
their professional knowledge – which includes not just law and not only criminal law – a staff 
could be established and strengthened that – instead of the “following” and “reacting” 
approach, is able to give instant answers and to prevent. This also requires suitable 
organisational frameworks and – with economic crime becoming international – international 
relationships to be developed continuously, as well.   
Finally, it is an important lesson that we must believe in the possibility of strengthening and 
developing economic morals.  
During one of the visits he made home, Denis Szabo, professor of criminology of Hungarian 
origin, said that he could envisage the only way of forcing back crime: the re-establishment of 
human honesty. These are deeply true, respectable and pathetic words, even if we feel, for the 
time being, they do not fall into arable soil with us.   
In the last decades, the role of economic morals more-or-less traditionally acknowledged and 
accepted in Western Europe was unknown in Hungary. The lack of moral rules of the 
economy and the unwritten norms of business ethics is a still stressful burden on our economy 
liberated from exterior and interior guardianship. The emerging market economy has little 
moral background, thus the legal regulation of the economy does not have moral coverage 
either. Among normal circumstances, ethics usually fills some mediating, assisting, orienting 
or even selecting role between everyday practise and the legal norms. In real market 
economies with great traditions, the basic moral rules of business activities are formed 
relatively early. In the rarest of cases these are written rules; it is not necessary to put them in 
writing as they are obvious, they form an organic part of the continuous operation of the 
economy. They function not as some ethics but as the basic conditions of belonging to the 
market and the operation of contractual relationships. It is natural that the obligations 
undertaken are to be abided by; the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” is not only a flowery 
catch-word but daily practise. It is also obvious – and it cannot be otherwise – that grabbers 
violating business honesty will be expelled; using unsecured loans, gambling, misleading and 
fraudulent manoeuvres conducted in the interest of economic advantages, misleading 
advertisements, the unlawful copying of the competitor’s trademark, marketing “Brummagem 
ware” or spoilt goods as excellent products necessarily leads to fall and final expulsion.8 Basic 
business honesty, therefore, even without fixed expectations is an indispensable element of 
market economy. This is how the business of countries we consider models can operate on the 
basis of the “honesty of the given word”, this is how contracts worth millions can be 
concluded by telephone, fax or even the Internet. 
In our country, the paternalistic system of planned economy, interfering with everything, 
endeavouring to regulate everything, was not favourable for the emergence of unwritten 
regulations even indirectly. On the contrary: the omnipotence and respect of written rules was 
 
8 Today, the actions listed are culpable without exception in the Hungarian Criminal Code. However, with firm 
ethical circumstances, a part of them would burden the law superfluously. The perpetrator of the crime entitled 
“marketing products of poor quality”, for instance, would be disqualified by the definite moral evaluation of the 
market once and for all from among the players of economic life.  
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getting stronger and stronger. Internal directions, circulars, lists of spheres of authority, 
working orders, and job descriptions multiplied and were often raised above the official 
sources of law. Though with the change of regime, the flow of this dropped significantly, the 
earlier approach hardly changed. On the wrecks of the pile of regulations and in lieu of the 
germs of business ethics, the interpretation of the principle of “anything that is not forbidden 
by legal regulations (naturally, written norms!) is allowed” became endless.  
We would like to believe that business morals can be strengthened together with the 
development of the economy, but we are convinced they can be taught and learnt as well. 
At the same time, the approach, motivation and even certain institutions of legal regulations 
may also strengthen and form the moral rules of market economy. While jurisdiction, in 
addition to its strictly meant “technical” tasks, may help the introduction of business honesty, 
may clarify the higher level of moral values and, during the course of the solution of legal 
conflicts, may turn into taking moral aspects into practise.  
 
5. Broker scandals in 2015 
 
The highest value economic crime came into light in 2015 in Hungary. The value of the 
suspected crime was 210.000.000.000 HUF, approximately 700.000.000 EUR, 1% of the 
GDP of Hungary.  
Tens of thousands of Hungarian depositors and investors have been affected by the loss of 
hundreds of millions of EUR worth of assets.  Local governments and various non-profits 
have lost hundreds of millions.  Brokers have been arrested.  At least one professional football 
club stands on the brink of bankruptcy.  It it turns out the Foreign Ministry kept billions of 
taxpayer money in high risk junk bonds.  All of this has happened since police raided the 
Budapest headquarters of the Buda-Cash Broker House the night of February 23rd 2015.9 
Hungary’s government denied insider trading after opposition members questioned a foreign 
ministry decision to withdraw state funds from a brokerage that filed for bankruptcy a few 
days later. The National Bank of Hungary suspended the licence of brokerage Quaestor on 
March 10, saying it may have sold more bonds than permitted under its issuance programme. 
The Hungarian opposition parties urged the foreign ministry to clarify whether it had any 
insider information about Quaestor’s finances. “The foreign ministry and its institutions had 
no unlawful information whatsoever,” it said on the government’s website. Quaestor was the 
third Hungarian brokerage to run into financial trouble within weeks in 2015.10 
Questor scandal has many open questions in the end of the year 2016, and the possible length 
of this criminal procedure can be 5-10 years too. The most important question is: how 
effective are the rules and norms of the new Hungarian economic criminal law in the new 
Penal Code. 
  
 
9 http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/brokerage-scandal-engulphs-hungary/21158 (30. 08. 2016.) 
10 http://www.euronews.com/2015/03/27/hungary-orbans-government-denies-insider-trading (30. 08. 2016.) 
